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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the effect of ownership structure on firm-specific stock price crash risk using listed firm (KOSPI) 
data in Korea. Prior literatures suggest that corporate governance has an impact on the level of disclosure and the 
quality. Managers may stockpile negative information about the company, but when such accumulated bad news 
crosses a threshold, the negative information suddenly becomes publicly available and a stock price crash is observed 
(Hutton, Marcus, & Tehranian, 2009). Prior studies have documented the determinants of future stock price crash 
risk (Jin & Myer, 2006; Hutton et al. 2009; Kim, Li, & Zhang, 2011; Hamm, Li, & Ng, 2013; Xu, Jiang, Chan, & Yi, 
2013; Jo, Moon, & Choi, 2015; Kim & Zhang, 2016). However, it is hard to find the papers about corporate ownership 
and future stock price crash risk at the term of determinants of the risk. Compare to some financially advanced 
countries where ownership and management are effectively separated, there is no clear distinction between ownership 
and management in Korea. Using the percentage of managerial ownership and that of foreign ownership as proxies 
for ownership structure and measures for future stock price crash risk which was used by Callen and Fang (2013, 
2015) and Kim and Zhang (2016), we conducted an empirical analysis examining the link between corporate 
ownership structure and companies’ subsequent stock price crash risk.  
 
We collect 4,294 firm-year observations listed on Korean market from 2002 to 2015, and we use the measures of firm-
specific stock price crash risk based on Callen and Fang (2013; 2015) to examine the relation between corporate 
ownership structure and subsequent stock price crash risk. 
 
From the empirical tests, the percentage of managerial ownership is negatively associated with future stock price 
crash risk. It implies that managerial ownership increases to align the interests of shareholders and managers, it 
could alleviate the agency problem between them (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), helping to resolve information 
asymmetry and prevent bad news from being withheld, ultimately lowering future stock price crash risk. In addition, 
we find that higher foreign ownership significantly weakens the negative relation between the percentage of 
managerial ownership and future stock price crash risk. We interpret this results that the negative side of foreign 
ownership failed to effectively reduce agency costs, weakening the negative correlation between managerial 
ownership and future stock price crash risk. 
 
Our study may shed some light on the understanding of the ownership structure as a determinant of future stock price 
crash risk to firms and investors who want to handle crash risk in the stock market. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Ownership Structure; Management Ownership; Foreign Investors; Stock Price Crash Risk 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
he purpose of this paper is to analyze the association between ownership structure and future stock 
price crash risk. In particular, we explored how ownership structure affects future stock price crash 
risk, by using the percentage of managerial ownership and that of foreign ownership as proxies for 
ownership structure. 
 
T 
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Managers may stockpile negative information about the company, but when such accumulated bad news crosses a 
threshold, the negative information suddenly becomes publicly available and stock price crash risk is increased 
(Hutton et al. 2009). Investors try to make reasonable investment decisions by accessing as much corporate 
information as they can, but a sudden and unexpected stock price crash could result in considerable loss to investors. 
Thus, investors and government agencies have increasingly become interested in exploring the determinants of stock 
price crash, and in fact, multiple studies have documented the determinants of stock price crash risk (Jin & Myer, 
2006; Hutton et al. 2009; Kim et al. 2011; Hamm et al. 2013; Xu et al. 2013; Kim & Zhang, 2016; Jo et al. 2015). 
 
Firm-specific stock price crashes occur when managers conceal bad news about the company from outside investors 
(Hutton et al. 2009). Managers engage in withholding bad news because agency conflicts exist between managers and 
investors (i.e., shareholders), leading to information asymmetry (Kothari, Shu, & Wysocki, 2009). Where ownership 
and management are separated, managers have superior information and are motivated to pursue their own interest at 
the expense of shareholders’ interest. Hence, if reporting adverse corporate information could cost managers their 
compensation, promotion opportunities or even jobs, they might attempt to relieve their career concerns by delaying 
the disclosure of bad news (Kothari et al. 2009). Thus, reducing agency conflicts could prevent managers from 
delaying the release of negative corporate information. 
 
In mitigating agency conflicts, managers with equity interests play a key role. Unlike some financially advanced 
countries where ownership and management are effectively separated, there is no clear distinction between ownership 
and management in South Korea. In other words, one person can act both as manager and shareholder (Yoon & Lee, 
2005). As such, managers could incur agency costs, but at the same time, they are also motivated to control the costs. 
Generally, the higher managerial ownership is, the less conflict of interest there is between managers and shareholders, 
resulting in reduced agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Zajac & Westphal, 1994; Warfield, Wild, & Wild, 1995). 
Thus, managers with high equity interest are clearly motivated to disclose more information in order to maximize firm 
value (Nagar, Nanda, & Wysocki, 2003). Under this logic, managerial ownership and the level of disclosure would be 
positively related; and as owner-managers would be less likely to delay the disclosure of bad news, managerial 
ownership and future stock price crash risk would be negatively related. On the other hand, managers with higher 
equity interest may incur agency costs since they are more likely to make decisions in their own best interests (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988; Park, 2003; Lee, Chun, & Kim, 2012), causing the level of 
disclosure to deteriorate. Even if no agency conflicts arise, the level of disclosure would still diminish as owner-
managers are not under big pressure to disclose corporate information. This means there would be a significant 
negative correlation between the level of disclosure and managerial ownership (Mak, 1991; Eng & Mak, 2003); and 
managers would be more likely to delay the release of bad news, so managerial ownership and future stock price crash 
risk would be positively related. Thus, it needs to be empirically confirmed whether a higher managerial ownership 
plays a positive or negative role in reducing agency costs, and how the percentage of managerial ownership affects 
information asymmetry and future stock price crash risk. 
 
Meanwhile, it is reported that foreign investors are generally proactive in monitoring and supervising the management, 
requiring managers to make reasonable management decisions. Naturally, the existence of foreign investors would 
reduce agency costs as well as information costs arising from information asymmetry (Roh, Bae, & Cheon, 2003; Kim 
& Kim, 2007; Chung, Ho, & Kim, 2004; Sachs & Warner, 1995).  In contrast, there is continuous criticism about how 
some foreign investors ask for higher dividends by taking advantage of their right as a large shareholder and focus on 
short-term profit harvesting and predatory investment strategy. As far as foreign ownership is concerned, there are 
conflicting views whether higher foreign ownership leads to positive or negative consequences. In this sense, we 
believe it would be worthwhile explaining how foreign ownership, a double-edged sword for business, affects agency 
costs and future stock price crash risk. And in case an owner-manager and a foreign investor both exist in one company, 
it is possible that agency costs could further be affected from the combined effects of managerial and foreign 
ownership. We took this into consideration and empirically examined the interaction effect between the percentage of 
managerial ownership and that of foreign ownership. 
 
In our empirical analysis, we employed a measure for future stock price crash risk, which was used by Callen and 
Fang (2013, 2015). We examined the relation between ownership structure and future stock price crash risk over our 
sample firms, i.e., public companies listed on KOSPI from 2002 to 2015, and discovered the following results. First, 
there was significant negative association between the percentage of managerial ownership (measured by the 
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percentage of common shares held by majority shareholder and related parties) and future stock price crash risk. This 
implies that higher managerial ownership aligns the interest between shareholders and managers, reducing the agency 
costs and information asymmetry (Jensen & Meckling, 1976); as managers are less motivated to stockpile bad news, 
the possibility of future stock price crash is reduced. Second, the higher the proportion of foreign investors, the weaker 
the negative association between the percentage of managerial ownership and future stock price crash risk. While the 
presence of foreign investors and owner-managers each help lower future stock price crash risk, future stock price 
crash risk is not further mitigated if they both exist in one company – it is because the negative side of the foreign 
ownership failed to reduce agency costs effectively or because the proportion of managerial ownership is inversely 
proportional to that of foreign ownership. 
 
This paper contributes to the current literature in several ways. First, by empirically proving that higher percentage of 
managerial ownership leads to lower stock price crash risk, we expand the discussion on the determinants of stock 
price crash risk. Specifically, we differentiate ours by showing the effect of managerial ownership, one of the internal 
corporate factors on stock price crash risk, that is not examined before. Second, we found that higher proportion of 
foreign investors weakens the negative association between managerial ownership and future stock price crash risk – 
this proves the interaction effect between managerial ownership and foreign ownership, two important factors of 
corporate governance, on stock price crash risk. Third, while prior Korean evidence studies on stock price crash proxy 
for stock price crash risk using extreme price decreases, in line with Hutton et al. (2009), our analysis employed a 
measure for future stock price crash risk, which was used by Kim and Zhang (2016), Callen and Fang (2013; 2015). 
Thus, this paper complements the previous Korean evidence research on stock price crash risk.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the previous literature and develops hypotheses 
used in the paper. Section III discusses the sample, variable measurements, and the research design, and Section IV 
presents the empirical test results and its interpretation. Finally, Section V concludes the paper. 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Corporate Ownership Structure and Disclosures 
 
The purpose of corporate disclosure is to decrease the adverse selection arising from an information asymmetry 
between investors and managers, to share internal information with outside investors, and to lower firms’ cost of 
capital (Diamond & Verrechia, 2001). However, if ownership and management are separated, managers may be 
tempted to make a decision that could maximize their personal benefit, instead of corporate values. And when 
managers make such decision, they sometimes hoard or intentionally distort information. In other words, managers 
are motivated to voluntarily disclose reliable information, but at the same time they are tempted to hide or intentionally 
distort information to maximize their personal benefits. In this regard, various studies have been conducted on which 
determinants help prevent information asymmetry caused by agency cost, and how ownership structure impacts the 
level of disclosure. 
 
Mak (1991) showed the negative relation between percentage of managerial ownership and the level of disclosure, 
while Hope and Thomas (2008) suggested that if the manager dominates the governance with his/her solid position, 
the company shows a lower level of disclosure. A study by Lee and Sohn (2005), measuring the level of disclosure 
proxied by the number of disclosures, indicated that the percentage of foreign and institutional investors’ equity 
ownership are proportionate to the level of disclosure, and the percentage of managerial ownership is inversely 
proportionate to the level of disclosure. El-Gazzar (1998) demonstrated a positive relation between institutional 
investors’ ownership and the level of voluntary disclosure, while Schadewitz and Blevins (1998) reported a negative 
relation between institutional investors’ ownership and the level of disclosure. 
 
2.2 Stock Price Crash Risk 
 
There have been a number of studies on stock price crash determinants, and some have found them inside companies. 
Kim et al. (2011) proved that tax avoidance, opportunistic behavior of hiding negative information, is positively 
correlated to stock price crash. Kim and Zhang (2016) explored the association between conditional conservatism and 
stock price crash at the firm level. Their empirical analysis concluded that the level of conservatism had a significant 
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negative relation with possibility of future stock price crash, and this relation was more evident in environments with 
higher information asymmetry, measured with R&D costs, industry competitiveness and number of financial analysts. 
Jo et al. (2015) employed a market-based measure for future stock price crash risk of Hutton et al. (2009) and proved 
that higher comparability of accounting information lowers possibility of bad news being withheld inside the company, 
thereby reducing the risk of stock price crash.  
 
Many researchers have studied external factors, in addition to factors internal to companies, as stock price crash 
determinants. Jin and Myer (2006) analyzed the association between stock price crash risk and opacity of the stock 
market by measuring transparency index, accounting standards, the number of accounting auditors in 40 countries. 
The research showed a positive relation between a company’s opacity and stock price crash risk. Xu et al. (2013) 
proved a positive relation between the number of financial analysts and stock price crash risk based on data of China, 
an emerging market. As financial analysts in emerging markets disclose more overall market information than 
company-specific information, insufficient disclosure of company-specific information may lead to higher risk of 
stock price crash. Callen and Fang (2013) studied institutional investors’ impact on stock price crash risk. Conflicting 
observations coexists, as some claim that institutional investors serve to monitor companies while others criticize them 
for their obsession with short-term profit and opportunistic behavior. Empirical analysis indicated that institutional 
investors mitigate stock price crash risk.  
 
One important internal corporate factor impacting stock price crash is disclosure. Hutton et al. (2009) studied the 
correlation between opacity of financial statements and stock price crash risks. They measured corporate opacity proxy 
as discretionary accruals and produced an empirical analysis result showing that the opaquer financial statements are, 
the higher the risk of stock price crash. The result is meaningful that it discovered a nexus between mandatory 
disclosure and stock price crash risk by proving that the opacity of information provided through mandatory 
disclosures is positively related to stock price crash risk. Hamm et al. (2013) showed a positive relation between 
earnings guidance and stock price crash risk, which implies that earnings guidance plays more of an opportunistic role 
than an informational role.1 Earnings guidance is a voluntary disclosure, so this result also indicates a relation between 
voluntary disclosures and stock price crash risk. Song (2015) used data of 13 emerging market countries to show that 
companies with excellent disclosure policies are less likely to have stock price crash, suggesting that companies’ 
disclosure policies have an impact on stock price crash risk.  
 
Meanwhile, few studies have directly analyzed the impact of ownership structure on future stock price crash risk. 
Therefore, our study aims to focus on corporate ownership structure, such as managerial ownership and foreign 
ownership, and their impact on future stock price crash risk.   
 
2.3 Hypotheses Development 
 
Rational investors deem non-disclosure as bad news and depreciate corporate values, incentivizing managers to 
disclose their information (Grossman & Hart, 1980; Milgrom, 1981; Verrechia, 1983; 2001). Also, non-disclosure of 
bad news might lead to litigation risk or reputation costs (Skinner, 1994), which prompts managers to disclose bad 
news too (Kasznik & Lev, 1995; Skinner, 1994; 1997). However, reporting adverse corporate information could cost 
managers their compensation, bonus, their stock option price, promotion opportunities or even jobs, they might try to 
relieve their career concerns by delaying the disclosure of bad news (Kothari et al. 2009). Previous studies have 
reported that if such agency problems cause managers to withhold bad news within the company, which then exceeds 
threshold, stock price may crash (Hutton et al. 2009). 
 
Convergence of interest hypothesis suggests that higher managerial ownership aligns interests of shareholders and 
managers, reducing agency costs and increasing corporate values (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Zajac & Westphal, 1994; 
Warfield et al. 1995). Therefore, managers with higher ownership are more strongly motivated to maximize corporate 
values by disclosing more of their information to the market (Nagar et al. 2003). In this case, managerial ownership 
is positively related to the level of disclosure and negatively related to future stock price crash risk, as managers are 
less likely to delay reporting bad news.  
                                                             
1 Earnings guidance help reduce information asymmetry between the managers and investors (Verrecchia, 2001), but may cause agency problem 
(Core, 2001; Healy & Palepu, 2001). 
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In contrast, entrenchment hypothesis demonstrates that managers with high ownership increases agency costs by 
making decisions to benefit their own interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Morck et al. 1988; Park, 2003; Lee et al. 2012), 
which may decrease the level of disclosure. And in cases where higher managerial ownership reduces agency costs, 
the level of disclosure may still decrease due to weaker pressure for disclosure. In these cases, therefore, managerial 
ownership and the level of disclosure have a significant negative relation (Mak, 1991; Eng & Mak, 2003). As bad 
news is more likely to be withheld in this situation, managerial ownership can be assumed to be positively related to 
future stock price risk.    
 
Therefore, the following null hypothesis is established for the relation between managerial ownership and future stock 
price crash risk.  
 
Hypothesis 1: There is no significant relation between managerial ownership and companies’ future stock price crash 
risk.   
 
Foreign investors serve to reduce managers’ agency costs through effective monitoring based on advanced techniques 
(Roh et al. 2003; Kim & Kim, 2007; Chung et al. 2004; Sachs & Warner, 1995). As foreign investors have more 
limited access to information compared to local investors, they are more active in monitoring managers in order to 
reduce costs of information asymmetry that might arise from such limited access (Sachs & Warner, 1995).Therefore, 
if investors successfully play the role of reducing agency costs by using more advanced techniques to check managers, 
they can mitigate information asymmetry and prevent bad news from being withheld, thereby solidifying the negative 
relation, or weakening the positive relation, between managerial ownership and future stock price crash risk.  
 
However, if foreign investors abuse their right as a large shareholder and ask for higher dividends and threaten 
managerial rights, or focus on short-term profit harvesting, they might undermine the company’s long-term investment 
activities, impairing corporate values in the long run (Pound, 1988; Baysinger, Kosnik, & Turk, 1991; Park & Lee 
2007; Kim & Cheon 2004). In this case, if foreign investors fail to play their role of monitoring managers and 
adequately reducing agency cost and information asymmetry, foreign ownership can weaken the negative relation, or 
solidify the positive relation between managerial ownership and future stock price crash risk.  
 
Therefore, the following null hypothesis is established for the impact of foreign ownership on the correlation between 
managerial ownership and future stock price crash risk.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Foreign ownership has no significant impact on the relation between managerial ownership and 
companies’ future stock price crash risk.   
 
III. SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Sampling 
 
Our samples were selected from KOSPI listed companies from 2002 to 20152. A total of 4,294 firm-years was used 
as samples. Financial data were extracted from Kis-Value Library, TS-2000 of Korea Listed Companies Association 
and Fn-Guide. Most Korean studies use for their financial and stock price data from these databases. Financial 
institutions, companies ending financial year in months other than December and companies whose financial 
statements and other important data are unavailable were excluded for consistency of samples. All variables are 
winsorized at top and bottom one-percentile to protect the results from the effects of extreme observations. 
 
3.2 Crash Risk Measures 
 
This study purposes to verify the relationship between corporate ownership structure and stock price crash, measured 
with managerial/foreign ownership. To verify this relation, we employed two primary measures of firm-specific stock 
price crash risk for each firm-year observation, following the previous literature (Chen et al. 2001; Hutton et al. 2009): 
                                                             
2 This paper only used KOSPI-listed companies as samples, because of doubt on whether KOSPI-listed companies and KOSDAQ-listed companies 
are comparable, as they experience different economic events that can be used as proxies for their PER.  
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(1) the negative coefficient of skewness of firm-specific daily returns (NCSKEW) and (2) the down-to-up volatility 
of firm-specific daily returns (DUVOL). 
 
Specifically, we first estimate the following expanded market model regression for each firm and year (Hutton et al. 
2009): 
 𝛾",$ = 𝛽' +	𝛽*,$𝛾+,$,- + 𝛽-,$𝛾+,$,* + 𝛽.,$𝛾+,$ + 𝛽/,$𝛾+,$0* + 𝛽1,$𝛾+,$0- + 𝛽2,$𝛾3,$,- + 𝛽4,$𝛾3,$,* +𝛽5,$𝛾3,$0* + 𝛽6,$𝛾3,$0- +∈",$  (1) 
 
Where ri,t is the return on stock i in week t, rm,t is the return on the KOSPI value-weighted market index in week t, and 
ri,t is the return on the value-weighted industry index based on two-digit the Korean Standard Industrial Classification 
(KSIC) codes. Lead and lag variables for the market index are included to allow for non-synchronous trading (Dimson, 
1979). We defined the firm-specific weekly return for firm i in week t (Wi,t) as the natural logarithm of one plus the 
residual return in equation (1), that is, Wi,t=ln[1+ei,t]3. 
 
Our first measure of firm-specific stock price crash risk, NCSKEW, is computed as the negative of the third moment 
of firm-specific weekly returns each sample year and divided by the standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns 
raised to the third power. Thus, for each firm i in year t, NCSKEW as 
 NCSKEW",$ = −[𝑛(𝑛 − 1)DE∑𝑊",$. /[(𝑛 − 1)(𝑛 − 2)(∑𝑊",$- )./-]  (2) 
 
where Wi,t is firm-specific weekly return as defined above, and n is observation numbers of firm specific returns during 
the fiscal year t. A negative sign is put in front of the third moment such that a larger value of NCSKEW signifies 
greater crash risk. 
 
The second measure of firm-specific crash risk is called the down-to-up volatility measure (DUVOL).  
 DUVOL",$ = log	{(𝑛S − 1)∑TUVWXY,ZE /(n\ − 1)∑S]XY,ZE }  (3) 
 
where nu and nd are the number of up and down weeks in year t, respectively. A higher value of DUVOL corresponds 
to a higher stock price crash risk. More specifically, for each firm i over a fiscal-year period t, we separated all the 
weeks with firm-specific weekly returns into two groups: when the returns are below (above) the annual mean and 
call this ‘‘down’’ (‘‘up’’) weeks. We further compute the standard deviation for the two predefined groups separately. 
We then calculate the natural logarithm of the ratio of the standard deviation of the “down” weeks to the standard 
deviation in the ‘‘up’’ weeks.  
 
3.2 Empirical Model and Variable Definitions 
 
We built the following model (4) to empirically analyze how firm’s ownership structure influences subsequent stock 
price crash risk, using the percentage of managerial ownership and that of foreign ownership as proxies.  
 𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻",$0* = 𝛽' + 𝛽*	𝑀𝑁𝐺𝑅",$ + 𝛽-	𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸",$ + 𝛽.	𝑀𝐵",$ + 𝛽/	𝑅𝑂𝐴",$ + 𝛽1	𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺",$ + 𝛽2	𝑀𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑇",$ +𝛽4	𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑇",$ + 𝛽5𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴",$ + 𝛽6	𝐿𝐸𝑉",$ + 𝛽*'𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸",$ +𝛽**𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻",$ + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅	𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌	𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌 
 
  
                                                             
3 The residuals from Eq. (1) is highly skewed, hence the logarithm transformation is performed to obtain a more symmetric distribution (Hutton et 
al. 2009).  
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Where 
 
CRASH = NCSKEW, DUVOL 
NCSKEW = negative skewness of firm-specific weekly returns 
DUVOL = the log of the ratio of the standard deviations of down-week to up-week firm-specific weekly 
returns 
MNGR = the largest shareholder and its affiliate person’s share of common stocks of company ‘i’ in 
year ‘t’ 
SIZE = the logarithm of total assets value of a firm 
MB = market value of equity divided by the book value of equity 
ROA = return on assets to measure firms’ performance 
TRADING = increment in monthly turnover rate year on year 
MNRET = arithmetic average of firm-specific weekly returns 
STDRET = standard deviation of firm-specific weekly returns 
BETA = beta index of market model during the previous 60 months  
LEV = firm leverage measures as the ratio of total liabilities to total asset 
OPAQUE = 3-year moving sum of the absolute value of annual performance-adjusted discretionary 
accruals 
 
First, two measurements of crash risk, NCSKEW and DUVOL, are applied to the dependent variable CRASH. The 
independent variable of interest (𝛽*	) uses percentage of managerial ownership (MNGR) for verification of hypothesis 
1. MNGR was measured as the proportion of managers’ stake to the entire shares of a company. To be more specific, 
it was measured as the largest shareholder and its affiliated person’s share of common stocks. The following control 
variables are controlled based on the previous studies (Chen et al. 2001; Hutton et al. 2009; Callen & Fang, 2013 & 
2015; Jo et al. 2015) as they are known to have an effect on stock price crash risk: NCSKEW, DUVOL, SIZE, MB, 
ROA, TRADING, MNRET, STDRET, BETA, LEV, OPAQUE, Year Dummy and Industry Dummy.  
 
Since the size of companies has a significantly negative relation with stock price crash risk, SIZE, or size of companies, 
was included in the regression equation to control size effect. And since MB and LEV have a positive relation with 
stock price crash risk (Kim, Li, & Li, 2014), they were included in the equation to be controlled. TRADING is a proxy 
indicating the difference in investor opinions. Higher TRADING values, meaning bigger difference in opinions 
amongst investors, increases the risk of stock price crash (Chen et al. 2014), and was therefore controlled. OPAQUE 
can be used as a proxy indicating opacity of financial statements and was included in the equation to be controlled 
because the opaquer financial statements are, the more likely stock prices are to crash (Hutton et al. 2009).       
 
Hypothesis 2 aims at verifying if foreign ownership weakens or strengthens the correlation between managerial 
ownership and future stock price crash risk. The following equation (5) is the model designed to verify it.  
 𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻",$0* = 𝛽' + 𝛽*	𝐹𝑅𝐺𝑁",$ + 𝛽-	𝑀𝑁𝐺𝑅",$ + 𝛽.	𝐹𝑅𝐺𝑁",$ ∗ 𝑀𝑁𝐺𝑅",$ + 𝛽/	𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸",$ + 𝛽1	𝑀𝐵",$ +𝛽2	𝑅𝑂𝐴",$ + 𝛽4	𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺",$ + 𝛽5	𝑀𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑇",$ + 𝛽6	𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑇",$ + 𝛽*'𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴",$ +𝛽**	𝐿𝐸𝑉",$ + 𝛽*-𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸",$ + 𝛽*.𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻",$ + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅	𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌 +𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌	𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌 
 
Where  
 
FRGN = the percentage of equity ownership by foreign investors 
 
In this equation, FRGN, or foreign ownership, is measured with the foreign investors’ share of common stocks.    
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IV. RESULTS 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics and Pearson Correlations 
 
Table 1 presents the sample distribution by year. Both crash risk measures (NCSKEW and DUVOL) have the highest 
crash risk in 2008 reflecting the financial crisis. Crash risk in 2012 is again considerably high, although not as high as 
during the financial crisis of 2008. This upward trend of stock price crash implies that many companies still fail to 
disclose negative information in a timely manner despite institutional and environmental changes such as the 
introduction of IFRS, tighter governance structure and external audits.   
 
 
Table 1. Sample Distribution 
Year Frequency Percent NCSKEWt+1 DUVOL t+1 
2002 250 5.82 -0.430 -0.208 
2003 260 6.05 -0.422 -0.220 
2004 276 6.43 -0.513 -0.240 
2005 280 6.52 -0.670 -0.349 
2006 291 6.78 -0.384 -0.198 
2007 300 6.99 -0.536 -0.279 
2008 308 7.17 -0.238 -0.125 
2009 317 7.38 -0.563 -0.280 
2010 324 7.55 -0.514 -0.263 
2011 357 8.31 -0.561 -0.277 
2012 336 7.82 -0.395 -0.208 
2013 334 7.78 -0.455 -0.232 
2014 339 7.89 -0.382 -0.197 
2015 322 7.50 -0.561 -0.282 
Total 4,294 100.00 -0.430 -0.208 
Note: This table reports the sample distribution and mean values of stock price crash risk by year. The sample includes 4,294 firm-year observations 
in 2002-2015. 
 
 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics about the variables used in our regressions. In this study, values smaller (bigger) 
than 1% (99%) of the distribution of each variable were replaced with 1% (99%) values, in order to reduce the impact 
of outliers. The average values of subsequent crash risk measures, NCSKEWt+1 and DUVOLt+1 are -0.471 and -0.238, 
respectively. The mean DUVOLt+1 is similar to the estimates in Chen et al. (2001), but that of NCSKEWt+1 is slightly 
lower than those reported in Lee et al. (2016), possibly because of the different sample market. The average and 
median values of MNGR t are 0.426 and 0.424 respectively, showing that controlling shareholder ownership of listed 
companies in Korea is significantly high on average, reaching close to 43%. The average FRGN t is 0.091, showing 
that foreign investors own an average of 9.1% of firms’ entire equity ownership.  
 
The average company size measured by the natural logarithm value of total asset, or SIZE t, is 26.510 and the average 
of MB t, the ratio of book value to market value, an indicator of growth rate, is 1.033. This means that the asset of 
sample companies showed market values similar to book values. The average LEV t and ROA t are 0.435 and 0.021, 
respectively. The average of OPAQUE t, the sum of discretionary accruals over three previous years, is 0.258.    
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of the Main Variables 
Variables Mean Std. Dev. 5% 25% MED. 75% 95% 
NCSKEW t+1 -0.471 0.825 -1.986 -0.894 -0.392 0.016 0.733 
DUVOL t+1 -0.238 0.365 -0.865 -0.474 -0.233 0.004 0.358 
MNGR t 0.426 0.164 0.168 0.309 0.424 0.526 0.713 
FRGN t 0.091 0.130 0.000 0.004 0.029 0.127 0.376 
SIZE t 26.510 1.387 24.517 25.508 26.299 27.323 29.268 
MB t 1.033 0.930 0.227 0.474 0.752 1.244 2.799 
ROA t 0.021 0.088 -0.118 0.006 0.032 0.062 0.120 
TRADING t -0.021 0.445 -0.608 -0.071 -0.006 0.037 0.462 
MNRET t -0.002 0.007 -0.014 -0.006 -0.002 0.002 0.011 
STDRET t 0.056 0.025 0.027 0.040 0.051 0.066 0.107 
BETA t 0.725 0.366 0.171 0.448 0.696 0.968 1.391 
LEV t 0.435 0.203 0.106 0.280 0.438 0.581 0.773 
OPAQUE t 0.258 0.587 0.023 0.065 0.111 0.180 0.949 
Note: This table reports descriptive statistics of the mean, median, and distributions of main variables used in this paper. All variables are winsorized 
at top and bottom one-percentile of the pooled data. 
 
 
Table 3 shows the Pearson correlation coefficients among crash risk (NCKEW t+1 and DUVOL t+1), percentage of 
managerial ownership (MNGR), the percentage of foreign ownership (FRGN), and other variables. In this table, 
NCKEW t+1 and DUVOL t+1 are significantly and positively correlated with each other with a ratio of approximately 
0.95, which is comparable to that reported by Chen et al. (2001). MNGR t has a significant negative association with 
NCKEW t+1 and DUVOL t+1, implying that the higher the proportion of managerial ownership, the more likely the firm 
has subsequent stock price crash risk. However, FRGN t have a significant positive association with NCKEW t+1 and 
DUVOL t+1, implying that higher percentage of foreign ownership leads to relatively higher future stock price crash 
risk. However, since the crash risk variables are reported to have significant correlation with other controlled variables 
set in the research model, the result of simple analysis of association between two variables is not sufficient to 
adequately verify the hypothesis. Therefore, in the following paragraph, we will look at the result of a multivariate 
regression analysis, which verified the hypotheses after controlling other variables with possible impact on crash risks. 
 
Table 4 provides the multivariate regression result of relation between managerial ownership and future stock price 
crash risk after controlling for other known determinants of crash risk. Column (1) and column (2) show that future 
stock price crash risk measurements, NCSKEW t+1 and DUVOL t+1, are significantly negatively associated with 
managerial ownership at 1% level. The finding indicates that higher managerial ownership means lower probabilities 
of future stock price crash risk. This result can be interpreted as suggesting that if managerial ownership increases to 
align the interests of shareholders and managers, it could alleviate the agency problem between them (Jensen & 
Meckling 1976), helping to resolve information asymmetry and prevent bad news from being withheld, ultimately 
lowering subsequent stock price crash risk. We find that the coefficients on SIZE t, NCSKEW t and MB t, are positive 
and significant across all three models, consistent with the findings of Chen et al. (2001). Also, we observe 
significantly negative coefficients on LEV t , which is similar to that reported by Hutton et al. (2009). 
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Table 3. Pearson Correlation Between Variables Analyzed 
 NCSKEW t+1 DUVOL t+1 MNGR t FRGN t SIZE t MB t ROA t 
NCSKEW t+1 1.000***   
    
DUVOL t+1 0.950*** 1.000      
MNGR t -0.066*** -0.053*** 1.000     
FRGN t 0.145*** 0.153*** -0.173*** 1.000    
SIZE t 0.203*** 0.203*** -0.005 0.467*** 1.000   
MB t 0.125*** 0.127*** -0.136*** 0.218*** 0.087*** 1.000  
ROA t 0.040*** 0.036** 0.144*** 0.238*** 0.183*** -0.016 1.000 
TRADING t 0.040*** 0.024 -0.011 0.005 0.028* 0.028 -0.029* 
MNRET t 0.071*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.072*** 0.078*** 0.168*** 0.301*** 
STDRET t -0.065*** -0.083*** -0.140*** -0.230*** -0.274*** 0.196*** -0.326*** 
BETA t 0.050*** 0.040*** -0.165*** 0.093*** 0.336*** 0.151*** -0.012 
LEV t -0.035** -0.046*** -0.124*** -0.157*** 0.122*** 0.124*** -0.341*** 
OPAQUE t 0.007 0.002 -0.019 0.067*** 0.127*** -0.005 0.014 
 
 TRADING t MNRET t STDRET t BETA t LEV t OPAQUE t 
TRADING t 1.000      
MNRET t -0.029* 1.000     
STDRET t 0.596*** 0.068*** 1.000    
BETA t 0.197*** -0.001 0.225*** 1.000   
LEV t 0.185*** -0.089*** 0.282*** 0.192*** 1.000  
OPAQUE t -0.059*** 0.020 -0.042*** -0.023 -0.020 1.000 
Note: This table presents Pearson correlation between the future stock price crash risk variables, the corporate ownership variables, i.e. percentage 
of managerial ownership and that of foreign ownership, and other control variables. ***, ** and * denote the significance level (two-tailed) at 1%, 
5% and 10% or less, respectively. 
 
 
Table 4. Results of Multivariate Regression Analysis on the effect of managerial ownership on stock price crash risk 𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻",$0* = 𝛽' + 𝛽*	𝑀𝑁𝐺𝑅",$ + 𝛽-	𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸",$ + 𝛽.	𝑀𝐵",$ + 𝛽/	𝑅𝑂𝐴",$ + 𝛽1	𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺",$ + 𝛽2	𝑀𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑇",$ + 𝛽4	𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑇",$ +𝛽5𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴",$ + 𝛽6	𝐿𝐸𝑉",$ + 𝛽*'𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸",$ + 𝛽**𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻",$ + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅	𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌	𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌 
Dep Var= (1) NCSKEW t+1 (2) DUVOL t+1 
Intercept -3.174*** -1.366*** 
MNGR t -0.322*** -0.126*** 
SIZE t 0.119*** 0.051*** 
MB t 0.091*** 0.046*** 
ROA t 0.062** 0.019*** 
TRADING t -1.553** -1.003 
MNRET t 6.904*** 2.903*** 
STDRET t -0.364** -0.188*** 
BETA t -0.060 -0.028 
LEV t -0.418*** -0.248*** 
OPAQUE t -0.044** -0.022** 
NCSKEW(DUVOL) t 0.322*** 0.051*** 
Year Fixed 
Industry Fixed 
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.106 
# of Samples 4,294 
Note: This table presents the coefficient estimators of regression for managerial ownership (MNGR t) on future stock price crash risk (NCSKEW t+1 
and DUVOL t+1). ***, ** and * denote the significance level (two-tailed) at 1%, 5% and 10% or less, respectively. 
 
 
Table 5 shows how foreign ownership impacts the effect of managerial ownership in lowering stock price crash risk. 
FRGN t *MNGR t, an interactive term of foreign ownership and managerial ownership, variables of interest of 
hypothesis 2, presents a significantly positive association with two future stock price crash risk variables. Foreign 
ownership and managerial ownership each contributes to lowering future stock price crash risk, but if their interaction 
is considered, the effect of reducing crash risk becomes weaker. This implied that the negative association between 
managerial ownership and subsequent stock price crash risk is weakened with the negative side of foreign ownership 
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failed to effectively reduce agency costs. This also seems to be relevant with the fact that managerial ownership and 
foreign ownership have statistically been substitutes. That is, higher managerial ownership reduces agency costs and 
prevents bad news from being withheld, thereby cutting crash risk, but a rise in foreign ownership comes at the expense 
of managerial ownership, weakening its role in lowering crash risks.  
 
 
Table 5. Results of Multivariate Regression Analysis on the effect of foreign investor ownership on the relation between managerial 
ownership and stock price crash risk 𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻",$0* = 𝛽' + 𝛽*	𝐹𝑅𝐺𝑁",$ + 𝛽-	𝑀𝑁𝐺𝑅",$ + 𝛽.	𝐹𝑅𝐺𝑁",$ ∗ 𝑀𝑁𝐺𝑅",$ + 𝛽/	𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸",$ + 𝛽1	𝑀𝐵",$ + 𝛽2	𝑅𝑂𝐴",$ + 𝛽4	𝑇𝑅𝐴𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐺",$ +𝛽5	𝑀𝑁𝑅𝐸𝑇",$ + 𝛽6	𝑆𝑇𝐷𝑅𝐸𝑇",$ + 𝛽*'𝐵𝐸𝑇𝐴",$ + 𝛽**	𝐿𝐸𝑉",$ + 𝛽*-𝑂𝑃𝐴𝑄𝑈𝐸",$ + 𝛽*.𝐶𝑅𝐴𝑆𝐻",$ + 𝑌𝐸𝐴𝑅	𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌 + 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝑈𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑌	𝐷𝑈𝑀𝑀𝑌 
Dep Var= (1) NCSKEW t+1 (2) DUVOL t+1 
Intercept -3.253*** -1.366*** 
FRGN t -0.006** -0.002* 
MNGR t -0.442*** -0.170*** 
FRGN t *MNGR t 0.014** 0.006** 
SIZE t 0.125*** 0.052*** 
MB t 0.094*** 0.046*** 
ROA t -0.401** -0.245*** 
TRADING t 0.063** 0.019 
MNRET t 6.855*** 2.899*** 
STDRET t -1.636** -1.023*** 
BETA t -0.063 -0.029 
LEV t -0.374*** -0.187*** 
OPAQUE t -0.039* -0.021** 
NCSKEW(DUVOL) t 0.053*** 0.050*** 
Adjusted R2 0.096 0.107 
Year Fixed 
Industry Fixed 
# of Samples 4,294 
Note: This table presents the results of the impact of foreign investor ownership (FRGN t) on the relation between managerial ownership (MNGRt) 
and future stock price crash risk (NCSKEW t+1 and DUVOL t+1). This table presents the coefficient estimators of regression for managerial ownership 
on. ***, ** and * denote the significance level (two-tailed) at 1%, 5% and 10% or less, respectively. 
 
 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In previous chapters, we explored how the corporate ownership influence companies’ subsequent stock price crash 
risk. Using the percentage of managerial ownership and that of foreign ownership as proxies for ownership structure 
and market-based measure for future stock price crash risk which was used by Callen and Fang (2013, 2015) and Kim 
and Zhang (2016), we conducted an empirical analysis examining the link between corporate ownership and 
companies’ future stock price crash risk. Compare to some financially advanced countries where ownership and 
management are effectively separated, there is no clear distinction between ownership and management in Korea.  
 
If higher managerial ownership reduces agency costs and increases the level of disclosures, we would expect the 
negative relation between the percentage of managerial ownership and the future stock price crash risk. On the other 
hand, if higher managerial ownership incurs agency costs and decreases the level of disclosures, the percentage of 
managerial ownership could be positively related with the future stock price crash risk. As for foreign ownership, if 
foreign investors monitor managers effectively, foreign ownership could solidify the negative relation or weaken the 
positive relation between managerial ownership and the future stock price crash risk. Whereas if foreign investors fail 
to play their monitoring role, foreign ownership could weaken the negative relation or solidify positive relation 
between managerial ownership and the future stock price crash risk. 
 
To test our hypotheses, we used firm-year observations from 4,294 companies listed on KOSPI over the period from 
2002 to 2015. We show the negative relation between the percentage of managerial ownership and future stock price 
crash risk. Also, we find that higher foreign ownership significantly weakens the negative relation between the 
percentage of managerial ownership and future stock price crash risk.  
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Our study expands the researches on the determinants of stock price crash risk by empirically showing the negative 
relationship between managerial ownership and the stock price crash risk and is specifically meaningful to investigate 
the interaction effect of managerial and foreign ownership on stock price crash risk. 
 
AUTHOR BIOGRAPHIES 
 
Soo Yeon Park (1st author) is an assistant professor of School of Business Administration at Chung-Ang University 
in Korea. Research interests include voluntary disclosures, and other financial & managerial accounting issues. E-
mail: sypark1229@gmail.com 
 
Younghyo Song (corresponding author) is a researcher of Institute for Business Research & Education at Korea 
University in Korea. Research interests include voluntary disclosures, equity valuation, and other financial accounting 
issues. E-mail: syh0511@korea.ac.kr 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Baysinger, B. D., Kosnik, R. D. & Turk, T.A. (1991). Effect of Board and Ownership Structure on Corporate R&D Strategy. 
Academy of Management Journal, 34, 205-214. 
Callen, J. L., & Fang, X. (2013). Institutional investor stability and crash risk: Monitoring versus short-termism? Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 37(8), 3047-3063. 
Callen, J. L., & Fang, X. (2015). Short interest and stock price crash risk. Journal of Banking and Finance, 60, 181-194. 
Chen, J., H. Hong, & Stein, J. C. (2001). Forecasting crashes: Trading volume, past returns, and conditional skewness in stock 
prices. Journal of Financial Economics, 61(3), 345–381. 
Chung, R., Ho, S., & Kim, J. B. (2004). Ownership structure and the pricing discretionary accruals in Japan. Journal of 
International Accounting, Auditing & Taxation, 13, 1-20. 
Core, J. (2001). A review of the empirical disclosure literature: Discussion. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31, 441-456. 
Diamond, D. W., & Verrecchia, R. E. (1991). Disclosure, liquidity, and the cost of capital. The Journal of Finance, 46(4), 1325-
1359. 
Dimson, E. (1979). Risk measurement when shares are subject to infrequent trading. Journal of Financial Economics, 7(2), 197–
226. 
El-Gazzar, S. (1998). Predisclosure information and institutional ownership: A cross-sectional examination of market 
revaluations during earnings announcement periods. The Accounting Review, 73(1), 119-129. 
Eng, L. & Mak, Y. (2003). Corporate governance and voluntary disclosure. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 22, 325-
345. 
Fama, E., & Jensen, M. (1983). Separation of ownership and control. Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 301-326. 
Grossman, S. J., & Hart, O. (1980). Disclosure laws and takeover bids. Journal of Finance, 35, 323–334. 
Hamm, S. J. W., Li, E. X. & Ng, J. (2013). Management earnings guidance and stock price crash risk. Working Paper. 
Healy, P. M., & Palepu, K. G. (2001). Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the 
empirical disclosure literature. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 31, 405-440. 
Hope, O.-K., & Thomas, W. (2008). Managerial empire building and firm disclosure. Journal of Accounting Research, 46(3), 
591–626. 
Hutton A. P., Marcus, A.J., & Tehranian, H. (2009). Opaque financial reports, R2, and crash risk. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 94(1), 67-86. 
Jensen M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory or the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. 
Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4)305-360. 
Jin, L., & Myer, S. C. (2006). R2 around the world: New theory and new tests. Journal of Financial Economics, 79(2), 257-292. 
Jo, E., Moon, H. & Choi, Y. (2015). The effect of comparability on firm-level stock price crash risk. Korean Accounting Review, 
40(4), 179-211.  
Kasznik, R., & Lev, B. (1995). To warn or not to warn: Management disclosures in the face of an earnings surprise. The 
Accounting Review, 70, 113-34. 
Kim, D. S., & Cheon, Y. S. (2004). Foreign investors vs. domestic investors, who are better informed investors? Asia-Pacific 
Journal of Financial Studies, 33(2), 1-44. 
Kim, M. T., & Kim, Y. H. (2007). the impacts of foreign ownership and outside directors on bond grading. Korean Accounting 
Review, 32(4), 29-58.  
Kim, J. B., Li, Y., & Zhang, L. (2011). Corporate tax avoidance and stock price crash risk: Firm-level analysis. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 100(3), 639-662. 
Kim, J. B. & Zhang, L. (2016). Accounting conservatism and stock price crash risk: Firm-level evidence. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 33(1), 412-441. 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2018 Volume 34, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 367 The Clute Institute 
Kim, Y., Li, H., & Li, S. (2014). Corporate social responsibility and stock price crash risk. Journal of Banking & Finance, 43, 1-
13. 
Kothari, S. P., Shu, S., & Wysocki, P. D. (2009). Do managers withhold bad news? Journal of Accounting Research, 47(1), 241-
276. 
Lee, A., Chun, S. & Kim, S. (2012). Controlling shareholders’ ownership structure and real earnings management. Korean 
Accounting Review, 37(1), 157-189.  
Lee, J. W., & Sohn, S. (2005). An empirical analysis of the relationship between corporate governance and corporate disclosure 
practices in Korea. Korean Accounting Review, 30(3), 33-69.  
Mak, Y. (1991). Corporate characteristics and the voluntary disclosure of forecasts information: A study of New Zealand 
prospectuses. British Accounting Review, 23, 305-327. 
Morck, R., Shleifer, A. & Vishny, R. W. (1988). Management ownership and market valuation: An empirical analysis. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 20, 293-315. 
Milgrom, P. (1981). Good news and bad news: Representation theorems and applications. Bell Journal of Economics, 12, 380–
391. 
Nagar, V., Nanda, D., & Wysocki, P. (2003). Discretionary disclosure and stock-based incentives. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 34(1-3), 283-309. 
Park, J. I. (2003). Corporate governance and earnings management: View from the largest shareholders’ holding. Korean 
Accounting Review, 28(2), 135-172.  
Pound, J. (1988). Proxy contests and the efficiency of shareholder oversight. Journal of Financial Economics, 20, 237-265. 
Rho, J. H., Bae, G. S., & Cheon, Y. (2003). Do firms with large agency costs choose high quality audits? A comparison of the 
audit quality between foreign-direct-investment-firms and local firms. Korean Accounting Review, 28(4), 203-230.  
Sachs, J. D., & Warner, A. (1995). Economic reform and the process of global integration. Brooking Papers on Economic 
Activity: 1-118. 
Song, L. (2015). Accounting disclosures, stock price synchronicity and stock price crash: An emerging market perspective. 
International Journal of Accounting & Information Management, 23(4), 349-363. 
Schadewitz, H., & Blevins, R. (1998). Major determinants of interim disclosures in an emerging market. American Business 
Review, 16(1), 41–55. 
Skinner, D. (1994). Why firms voluntarily disclose bad news? Journal of Accounting Research, 32, 38-61. 
Skinner, D. (1997). Earnings disclosures and stockholder lawsuits. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 23, 249-283. 
Verrecchia, R. (1983). Discretionary Disclosure. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 5, 179–194. 
Verrecchia, R. (2001). Essays on Disclosure. Journal of Accounting & Economics, 32, 97–180. 
Warfield, T.D., Wild, J. J., & Wild, K. L. (1995). Managerial ownership, accounting choices, and informativeness of earnings. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20(1), 61-91. 
Xu, N., Jiang, X., Chan, K. C., & Yi, Z. (2013). Analyst coverage, optimism, and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China. 
Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 25, 217-239. 
Yoon, S. M, & Lee, M. J. (2005). The effect of separation of ownership and control on valuation in the Stock Market. The Review 
of Social & Economic Studies, 25, 221-259.  
Zajac, E. J. & Westphal, J. D. (1994). The costs and benefits of managerial incentives and monitoring in large U.S. corporation: 
When is more no better? Strategic Management Journal, 121-142. 
 
  
The Journal of Applied Business Research – March/April 2018 Volume 34, Number 2 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 368 The Clute Institute 
NOTES 
